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NOTES

WHEN CONSUMER PROTECTION BECOMES
PREORDAINED: MALCOLM v. EVENFLO AND
MONTANA’S PRODUCTS LIABILITY STANDARD
Justin Harkins*

I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Montana Supreme Court, Montana’s products liability law was enacted in order to provide “maximum protection for consumers against dangerous defects in manufactured products.”1 That goal is a
worthy and welcome one: consumers demand and deserve protection from
manufacturers that market dangerous products, and the State is uniquely
positioned to provide that protection. The application of the maximum protection goal is complicated, however, by the obstacle of determining what,
exactly, renders a product dangerously defective. Especially when products
are designed to protect consumers from foreseeable dangers, it can be extremely difficult to differentiate actual defects from unavoidable limitations.
In many instances, government regulations exist to provide a minimum
safety standard that manufacturers must meet before marketing their products.2
* Justin Harkins, candidate for J.D. 2014, University of Montana School of Law, and M.S. 2014,
University of Montana Environmental Studies Program. The author would like to thank the editors and
staff of the Montana Law Review for all of their help and hard work. Additional thanks to Vicky, Bill,
and Andrew Harkins, and Flo and Bob Smith for nearly three decades of patience and support, and
special thanks to Michelle and Otter for their love and companionship in Montana and beyond. Finally,
the author wishes to express his deepest sympathies to the Malcolm family and to their loved ones and
friends. The author was careful to limit his comments on this case to the applicable laws.
1. Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Mont. 1997).
2. See e.g. 49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (2009) (stating the purpose of the regulation for child restraint
systems is “to reduce the number of children killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in aircraft”).
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Unfortunately, the responsible use of an acceptably safe product is not
tantamount to invincibility; accidents still happen and people still get hurt.
In Montana, injured parties may file suit against the manufacturer or seller
of any product whose defective design may have caused or compounded an
injury.3 Montana statutes cannot provide an exhaustive list of products that
may be at issue in a given case, replete with any unacceptable defects those
products may suffer, so it is incumbent upon individual juries to determine
whether each challenged product is indeed defective. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a product’s performance in safety regulation
tests is appropriate information to provide to a jury that may be insufficiently familiar with the product’s reasonable expectations.4 The Montana
Supreme Court disagrees.5
Through its refusal to adopt the Restatement (Third)’s evidentiary standard, the Court has elevated its goal of maximum protection for consumers
above its responsibility to fairly and efficiently decide the cases that come
before it. This decision begets three especially pernicious and avoidable
consequences: first, manufacturers are saddled with the unreasonable burden of justifying their safety-conscious decisions without the ability to present the metric that guides those decisions; second, the impartiality of the
jury is compromised because the same test results that are forbidden in determining defectiveness are allowed to help determine punitive damages;
and third, manufacturers have a clear incentive to restrict their product lines
to only those products that boast the safest designs even to the unreasonable
exclusion of products with designs that may be less safe but feature characteristics that are otherwise attractive to discerning consumers. Each of
these consequences is on display in the 2009 products liability case Malcolm v. Evenflo. Section II of this note presents a brief history of products
liability in Montana. Section III provides the facts of Malcolm, and Section
IV details the Montana Supreme Court’s holding and the justices’ commentary. Section V analyzes the holding and discusses its effects. Section VI
summarizes the implications of Malcolm for Montana practitioners.
II. HISTORICAL APPROACH

TO

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

The Court in Malcolm, in both the majority opinion and two of the
dissents, discussed the “well-settled, decades-old principles of strict liability” to which the Court adhered.6 According to Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company, Montana first heard a products liability case in
3. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–719 (2011).
4. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b) (1998).
5. Malcolm v. Evenflo, 217 P.3d 514, 522 (Mont. 2009).
6. Id. at 522; see also id. at 535 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting) and id. at 544 (Rice, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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1973.7 At least as far back as Kuiper in 1983, the Court distinguished strict
products liability from standard negligence. Kuiper held that strict liability
“imposes on the seller a duty to prevent the release of ‘any product’ in the
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or the consumer,
‘into the stream of commerce.’”8 In 1987, this strict liability approach was
codified as Montana Code Annotated § 27–1–719, providing that a seller,
whether manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer, is liable for any physical
harm caused by a defective, unreasonably dangerous product. The seller is
liable even if it “exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product” and did not directly sell the product to the eventual user.9 Section 27–1–719(5) provides only two affirmative defenses: (a) the user discovered the defect, or the defect was obvious and the user made use of the
product anyway; or (b) the user unreasonably misused the product.10
In Sternhagen, a 1997 case upon which Malcolm relied heavily,11 the
Court enumerated eight public policy considerations that led to the adoption
of the strict liability standard. These are:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against their
recurrence, which the consumer cannot do.
The cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person injured while the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and be distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business.
It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products.
It is in the public interest to place responsibility for injury upon the manufacturer who was responsible for [the defective product] reaching the
market.
That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer and wholesaler of the defective product in order that they may act as the conduit
through which liability may flow to reach the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility lies.
That because of the complexity of present day manufacturing processes
and their secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent conduct by the injured plaintiff is almost impossible.
That the consumer does not have the ability to investigate for himself the
soundness of the product.
That this consumer’s vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing
devices and trademarks.12

7. Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 673 P.2d 1208, 1219 (Mont. 1983).
8. Id. at 1222 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 401(a)(65) (1965)).
9. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–719(1), (3).
10. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–719(5).
11. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 520–522 (majority); id. at 530 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1142–1143 (citing Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, 513 P.2d
268, 273 (Mont. 1973)).
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Sternhagen also specifically rejected the “state-of-the-art defense,”
which allows manufacturers to present evidence that a design, while not
necessarily safe, was as safe as possible given current technology.13 Because the state-of-the-art defense includes elements of reasonableness and
foreseeability, the Court determined that allowing it
would inject negligence principles into strict liability law and thereby “sever
Montana’s strict products liability law from the core principles for which it
was adopted—maximum protection for consumers against dangerous defects
in manufactured products” with the focus on the condition of the product, and
not on the manufacturer’s conduct or knowledge.14

It was for precisely that reason (indeed, with precisely that quote15) that the
Malcolm Court rejected § 4(b) of the Restatement (Third).16
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 was introduced in 1998.17 It consists of two subsections and provides guidance for
defective design liability where a government regulation is at issue. Subsection (a) provides that a product’s noncompliance with applicable regulation “renders [it] defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by
the statute or regulation.”18 Subsection (b), deemed “controversial” in Justice Nelson’s dissent,19 provides that
a product’s compliance with an applicable [safety regulation] is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with respect to the
risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance
does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.20

The subsections’ contrasting effects are important. Under subsection (a),
noncompliance with a regulation conclusively establishes that the product is
defective, thereby completely removing the decision from a jury.21 Subsection (b), however, provides only that compliance is proper for consideration, and it expressly restricts potential misapplication by noting that compliance does not bar a jury from determining that a product is defective.22
It is apparent both that the Court has taken seriously its mission to
provide maximum protection to consumers in products liability cases and
that the standard applied in such cases is, as the Court intimated in Malcolm, well-settled and decades-old.23 Noteworthy, though, is that the Court
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1147.
Id. at 1144.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 521 (quoting Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1144).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 522.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4.
Id. at § 4(a).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 535 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b).
Id. at § 4(a).
Id. at § 4(b).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 521–522.
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in Kuiper recognized that liability issues focus “on whether the product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous, not only upon the conduct of the
user or the seller.”24 That the Court included the conduct of the user or
seller in the equation whatsoever differentiates the standard it applied in
Kuiper from the policy it has employed in more recent cases. If any ambiguity remained about the Court’s willingness to tolerate the application of
the negligence standard in products liability, it was doubtless extinguished
by Sternhagen,25 but the fact that the Court’s standard has evolved in the
past is an encouraging sign that it may do so in the future.
Although not a products liability case, the Court relied heavily on its
recent decision in Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco26 in the Malcolm analysis, and a short description of the facts and holding in that case
will be helpful here. Sunburst was decided in August 2007, which was after
the jury’s original verdict in Malcolm.27 The case was brought by the city
of Sunburst, Montana, where Texaco had operated a gasoline refinery from
1924 to 1961.28 Sunburst alleged various harms incidental to contamination
from benzene, a chemical used by the refinery.29 Following a three-week
trial, a jury awarded Sunburst $16 million in compensatory damages, $15
million in restoration damages, and $25 million in punitive damages.30
Texaco appealed the verdict on several grounds, but the one especially germane to the discussion of Malcolm is the district court’s exclusion of evidence of discussions Texaco had with Montana’s Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”).31 Regarding this point, the Court ruled that the
district court had acted improperly when it excluded the DEQ evidence because that evidence had bearing on Texaco’s state of mind at the time the
harm occurred, and “[a] good faith effort to comply with all government
regulations ‘would be evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental
state requisite for punitive damages.’”32 Despite this particular ruling, the
Court reiterated the broad discretion enjoyed by district courts regarding
expert testimony, writing that “without a showing of abuse of discretion, the
district court’s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal.”33

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Kuiper, 673 P.2d at 1222.
Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1144.
Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 520.
Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1083.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1086–1087.
Id. at 1084.
Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 484 F. Supp. 566, 582 (W.D. Okla. 1979)).
Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1094 (citing State v. Vernes, 130 P.3d 169, 173 (Mont. 2006)).
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III. FACTS
A. The History of the “On My Way”
The “On My Way” (“OMW”) is a series of rear-facing child safety
seats manufactured by Evenflo, designed to safely transport infants weighing up to twenty pounds.34 The OMW includes a detachable base that allows a user to convert the seat into a baby carrier without disturbing the
child. Use of the base is not required, however, because the seat is designed
to strap into the car either with the base or without it.35 If the user chooses
not to employ the base, she will route the seatbelt through an open hook,
around the back of the seat, and through another hook before securing the
seatbelt in its buckle.36
Pursuant to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (“FMVSS”) 213,
each seat design is tested to determine whether it meets minimum safety
standards before the seat can be sold to consumers.37 It is undisputed that
the OMW passed a front-impact test at 27 to 30 miles per hour;38 in dispute
was whether or not the OMW was ever tested in rear-impact, side-impact,
or rollover tests, which are not required by FMVSS regulation.39 At any
rate, the OMW was found to be in compliance with applicable regulations
and was distributed to sellers for consumer purchase.40
By February 1995, Evenflo discovered that the open seatbelt hooks
were points of weakness on the OMW model 206.41 Evenflo alerted the
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) that the
OMW 206 was not in compliance with FMVSS 213, but the company cited
a separate problem with the seat and did not inform the NHTSA of the hook
weakness.42 Evenflo created a retrofit kit that it sent to OMW 206 owners
and attached to the 206s that remained in its inventory.43 For the next series
of On My Way safety seats, branded OMW 207, Evenflo strengthened the
aforementioned points of weakness.44 However, even after the changes,
Evenflo was alerted to instances of consumer hook failure on both the retrofitted 206 and the production 207.45
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 517.
Id.
Id.
49 C.F.R. § 517.213 (2008).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 517.
Id.; Appellant’s Reply Br., 18, Malcolm, 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 2009).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 517.
Appellee’s Response Br., 3, Malcolm, 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 2009).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 517.
Id. at 517–518.
Id. at 518.
Id.
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B. Tragedy in Emigrant
In 2000, Jessica and Chad Malcolm lived on a ranch near Emigrant,
Montana.46 Jessica received an OMW 207 as a gift while she was pregnant
with their son, Tyler.47 Jessica called Evenflo to inquire about the safety
record of the seat she was given, and the company assured her that the
model was safe for use and was not subject to any recalls.48 On January
16th of that year, Jessica drove to Emigrant. Her sister rode in the front
passenger seat, and Tyler, by then an infant, was strapped into the OMW in
the back.49 During the ride back to the ranch, an oncoming driver crossed
the middle line and forced Jessica off the road.50 Her vehicle rolled three
times, slid down a hill, and came to rest in a ditch.51 Jessica emerged relatively unscathed, but her sister and Tyler both suffered serious head injuries.52 Tyler was found secured in the OMW approximately sixty feet from
the spot where the vehicle came to rest; his injuries were fatal.53 Inspection
of the OMW revealed that one of the seatbelt hooks had broken off during
the accident.54
The Malcolms filed suit against Evenflo, alleging that the OMW 207
“constituted a defectively designed product that failed catastrophically even
though they had used the seat in a reasonably anticipated manner.”55 The
Malcolms also alleged that the OMW’s design was defective due to its open
seatbelt hooks and inadequate padding to protect the child’s head.56 The
Malcolms argued that Evenflo could have made the OMW safer by designing it with a closed seatbelt tunnel (which, in fact, the OMW base unit
featured57), instead of its open seatbelt hooks.58 In addition, the family
sought punitive damages, alleging Evenflo consciously and deliberately disregarded the danger the OMW posed to the public when it refused to disclose the seat’s spotty performance record.59
Evenflo maintained that the OMW was not defective and that Tyler’s
death was caused exclusively by the force of the accident.60 The company
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 518.
Id. at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 519.
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submitted a scenario in which the door closest to Tyler was forced open
during the rollover, leaving Tyler unprotected when he impacted the ground
as the car rolled.61 This hypothesized impact caused the seat to detach from
the car and travel unrestrained through the open door, Evenflo argued.62
Both parties filed pretrial motions.63 Evenflo moved for partial summary judgment as to the punitive damages, asserting both that no evidence
existed showing actual fraud or malice and that its compliance with FMVSS
213 preempted a claim for punitive damages.64 The district court denied
the motion.65 The Malcolms filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence
of the OMW 207’s FMVSS compliance.66 The district court granted this
motion, ruling that the test results were not relevant and would be excessively prejudicial even if they were relevant.67
At trial, Lou D’Aulerio, the Malcolms’ expert witness, testified that
the OMW 206 and 207 models “failed” in 27% of the independent tests that
he conducted.68 Evenflo argued that D’Aulerio’s characterization violated
the court’s in limine ruling because Evenflo could not introduce evidence
that the 207 actually had passed FMVSS testing.69 The court rejected
Evenflo’s argument.70 After a ten-day trial,71 the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the Malcolms, awarding $6.7 million in compensatory damages
and $3.7 million in punitive damages.72 The award was, according to Evenflo, “many times greater than any previous wrongful death verdict in the
State of Montana.”73 Evenflo appealed both damage awards.74
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT’S REASONING

The Montana Supreme Court focused its review on four aspects of the
case.75 First, it reviewed whether the district court’s exclusion of Evenflo’s
evidence of FMVSS compliance was improper regarding compensatory
damages.76 In affirming the district court’s ruling,77 the Court relied prima61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 519.
Id.
Id.
Appellant’s Reply Br., 13, Malcolm, 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 2009).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 520.
Id. at 519–520.
Id. at 520.
Appellant’s Reply Br., 1, Malcolm, 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 2009).
Id.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 517.
Id. at 520.
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rily on the distinction it has drawn between cases sounding in strict liability
and those sounding in negligence.78 Quoting Lutz v. National Crane
Corp.,79 the Court noted that “[the] issue in products liability cases is not
the conduct of the ‘reasonable person,’ but the condition of the product.”80
The Court rejected the Restatement (Third) § 4 because it believed that allowing negligence principles into products liability cases would detract
from the main purpose of Montana’s strict liability law:81 the “maximum
protection for consumers against dangerous defects in manufactured products.”82
Next, the Court reviewed whether the district court improperly admitted evidence regarding the performance of the OMW model 206, even
though the seat at issue in the accident was a model 207.83 The district
court’s ruling on this point was also affirmed,84 despite Evenflo’s contention that the designs of the 206 and 207 substantially differed.85 The Court
cited Preston v. Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin
County, which held that similar incidents involving similar products are admissible in Montana product liability cases.86 Ultimately, the Court deferred to the judgment of the district court regarding the two models’ similarity and relied on Sunburst to determine that the district court’s ruling was
not an abuse of its discretion.87
The Court’s third point of review focused on whether the district court
unfairly excluded evidence of the OMW 207’s compliance with FMVSS
213.88 Again, the Court refused to reverse the district court on the basis
that the lower court did not abuse the broad discretion that it was granted in
Sunburst.89 Though the Court admitted that the district court’s evidentiary
rulings left Evenflo with an arduous task, it emphasized the “heavy burden
on the manufacturer of products” that Montana’s products liability law demands.90
77. Id. at 523.
78. Id. at 521.
79. Lutz v. Natl. Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455 (Mont. 1994).
80. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 521 (quoting Lutz, 884 P.2d at 462) (emphasis in original).
81. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 522.
82. Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1144.
83. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 523.
84. Id. at 525.
85. Appellant’s Reply Br., 31, Malcolm, 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 2009).
86. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 524 (citing Preston v. Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., Gallatin Co., 936
P.2d 814, 819 (Mont. 1997)).
87. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 525.
88. Id. at 526.
89. Id. at 530 (citing Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1095).
90. Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 530.
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Finally, the Court reviewed whether the district court’s exclusion of
FMVSS compliance was improper for determining punitive damages.91 In
its sole reversal of the district court, the Court overturned the Malcolms’
punitive damage award, holding that FMVSS compliance may evince a
“good faith effort” by Evenflo that would not be consistent with the actual
fraud or actual malice required for punitive damages.92 The Court again
relied heavily on Sunburst in ruling that a court abuses its discretion if it
awards punitive damages despite excluding evidence that appears to show
the motive or state of mind of the defendant.93
Justice Morris wrote the Court’s opinion, which Justices Leaphart and
Warner joined in full.94 Chief Justice McGrath wrote a concurring opinion
that recommended bifurcating jury trials to prevent juries from hearing evidence affecting punitive damages that they cannot consider for compensatory damages.95 Justice Rice concurred with the Court’s reversal of punitive damages but disagreed with the Court’s ruling that the FMVSS exclusion was fairly applied. Citing Montana Rule of Evidence 106, he insisted
that “[t]here cannot be one set of evidentiary rules for a plaintiff, and a
different set of rules for a defendant, even in a products liability case.”96
Justice Nelson, with Justice Cotter joining in full, concurred with the
Court’s decision to uphold compensatory damages but “strenuously” dissented with its decision to reverse on the punitive damages.97 Justice Nelson’s argument was threefold. First, like Justice Rice, he criticized the
Court for requiring juries to disregard evidence with respect to compensatory damages that they must consider for punitive damages, saying that
“this approach forces jurors into needless and infeasible mental gymnastics.”98 Next, he disagreed with the Court that exclusion of the FMVSS
evidence was prejudicial because Evenflo was otherwise successful in
presenting evidence to suggest that it had acted in good faith and without
actual malice or fraud.99 Finally, he disagreed that the district court abused
its discretion by excluding the evidence.100 Justice Nelson explained that
relevance is not sufficient for admission if the evidence might prove unfairly prejudicial or confusing to the jury.101 Therefore, even if the evidence had been “marginally relevant,” the district court acted within its au91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 532; see also Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–221.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 531 (citing Sunburst, 165 P.3d at 1096).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 516, 533.
Id. at 533 (McGrath, C.J., specially concurring).
Id. at 534 (Rice, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Mont. R. Evid. 106).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 544, 545 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 543.
Id. (citing Mont. R. Evid. 403).
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thority in excluding the FMVSS results.102 Nelson relied on Seltzer v. Morton103 in his conclusion that the district court did not “[act] arbitrarily
without conscientious judgment or [exceed] the bounds of reason when it
excluded the evidence of Evenflo’s compliance with FMVSS 213.”104
V.

ANALYSIS

Given the Court’s stated priority of maximizing protection for consumers and its historical treatment of products liability issues, its ruling in Malcolm v. Evenflo is neither surprising nor, strictly speaking, wrong. The decision is well-founded and well-reasoned, and the deference shown to the
district court is laudable. However, the problems caused by the Court’s
fidelity to precedent and priority are plain and unresolved. These include a
fundamental unfairness with respect to manufacturers, an unreasonable demand with respect to jurors, and an unnecessary diminution of the market
with respect to consumers. When the Court refused to adopt the evidentiary
standard endorsed by the Restatement (Third), these problems were implicitly accepted as tolerable consequences in pursuit of the Court’s priorities,
yet it remains unclear how the introduction of regulation test results would
unduly hinder a compelling products liability claim. The current standard’s
questionable value does not overcome its weaknesses, and the following
analysis will demonstrate that Montana’s Supreme Court should retire its
products liability precedent in favor the superior standard set forth in § 4 of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
A. A Fundamental Unfairness With Respect to Manufacturers
The Montana Supreme Court’s refusal to allow manufacturers to present evidence of their compliance with applicable government regulations
requires manufacturers to defend against claims of defectiveness and inadequate safety without any functional definitions of “defectiveness” or
“safety.” The rule in Montana states only that “[a] product is in a defective
condition to a user if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that anticipated by
the ordinary user,”105 thereby introducing additional vague terminology into
an already murky landscape. In disallowing evidence of regulatory compliance, the Court has effectively deprived both manufacturer and jury of valuable, concrete information regarding a given product’s relative safety.
102.
103.
104.
582).
105.

Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 543 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561 (Mont. 2006).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 543 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Seltzer, 154 P.3d at
Mont. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. 7.01 (2d ed. 2003).
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As Malcolm illustrates, the ambiguity created by the Court’s standard
is easily exploited by opportunistic plaintiffs. From the trial’s opening
statement onward, the Malcolms sought to depict the OMW as having
“failed.”106 They referred to “failures” during independent testing.107 They
referred to “failures” of individual parts of the seat.108 They even introduced into evidence a chart entitled “test failures.”109 As Justice Rice put it
in his dissent, however, “[w]hile the efficacy of the FMVSS 213 testing can
certainly be debated, nonetheless, the truth is, the OMW seat had actually
passed that testing.”110 The Malcolm Court allowed the plaintiffs to capitalize on the lower court’s evidentiary ruling when it dismissed Evenflo’s objections as “semantic” arguments about the appropriate level of technicality
that should be afforded to the word “failures.”111 According to Justice
Rice, “[f]rom Malcolms’ one-sided characterization of the testing, the jury
took to deliberations a simple, powerful, yet fundamentally untrue proposition: that the OMW seat had ‘failed’ mandatory testing.”112
The Court should adopt the evidentiary standard endorsed by the Restatement (Third) in order to ensure a fair trial for both plaintiff and defendant. This standard would allow manufacturers to educate juries about the
required regulations. It would also allow manufacturers to differentiate empirically between the performance of two products, such as the OMW 206
and 207, that may seem substantially similar but may include certain significant differences, and it would make it harder for plaintiffs to unfairly misrepresent product performance. The public policy considerations at issue
would remain viable because the strict liability standard inherently places a
heavy burden on the manufacturer, and the Restatement specifically notes
that regulatory compliance is not sufficient to establish absence of defect.
The district court in Malcolm prohibited evidence of FMVSS compliance in part because it thought that the results would confuse the jury,113
but the Court later expressed confidence in juries’ abilities to overcome
what Justice Nelson deemed the “mental gymnastics”114 required to consider the defendant’s regulatory compliance for punitive damages but not
for compensatory damages.115 If the Court trusts juries to parse evidence
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 526 (majority).
Id. at 527.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 534 (Rice, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 526 (majority).
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 534 (Rice, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 519 (majority).
Id. at 534 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 532 (majority).
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with regard to different types of awards, it should also trust juries to understand that a product can be both compliant and defective.
The Supreme Court of Appeals in West Virginia dealt with this very
issue in Johnson v. General Motors Corporation.116 Johnson involved a
two-car, head-on collision in which both drivers were killed.117 The plaintiffs in the case were Gregory and Andrew Johnson, brothers riding in the
backseat of a car that was being driven by one of their parents.118 The
Johnsons filed suit against General Motors Corporation (“GM”), maintaining that the car’s lap-only seatbelts constituted a defective design.119 Much
like in Malcolm, the Johnsons’ claim asserted that the defectiveness of the
seatbelt design was, at least in part, due to the availability of a superior
alternative design (in this case, the now-standard lap and shoulder restraint
system).120 The jury agreed that the lap-only belt was defective and
awarded $3.1 million to Gregory and $45,000 to Andrew.121
On appeal, the West Virginia Court reviewed the jury instruction regarding GM’s FMVSS compliance. The instruction read, in pertinent part:
In the course of the trial of this lawsuit, evidence has been introduced to
the effect that the vehicle, manufactured and sold by Defendant, complied
with certain Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards established by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration.
With respect to those Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, you are
instructed that compliance by a manufacturer with federal standards, existing
at the time the product was manufactured and prescribing standards for design, inspection, testing, or manufacture of a product, is a factor which you
may take into consideration in determining whether the car was defective. It
is not of itself conclusive either way.
I charge you that industry standards are not conclusive as to ordinary
care and design or manufacture, but rather are admissible evidence for your
consideration, together with all the other evidence in this case.122

The West Virginia Court upheld the jury instruction and remarked, notably,
that “the jury did not have to find that the manufacturer’s conduct was reasonable merely because it followed the federal motor vehicle safety standards.”123 That the jury eventually found for the plaintiff, even with the
inclusion of the FMVSS compliance evidence, confirms that the Restatement (Third) standard neither expressly nor practically precludes a jury
from finding for a plaintiff when appropriate. The West Virginia instruc116. Johnson by Johnson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 438 S.E.2d 28, 33 (W. Va. 1993).
117. Id. at 31.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 31–32.
121. Id. at 32. The trial court reduced the awards by the amount the Johnsons each received from the
estate of the driver with whom they collided. The full awards were eventually reinstated on appeal.
122. Id. at 39.
123. Johnson, 438 S.E.2d at 39.
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tion succinctly and specifically explains both the ability of the jury to consider the compliance information and its freedom to nevertheless deem the
product defective. It represents a suitable application of the Restatement’s
recommendation, and the Montana Supreme Court would do well to evince
a similar faith in its jurors.
The purpose of a products liability trial is to determine whether an
injury occurred due to a dangerous, defective product;124 the purpose of
such a trial is not to guarantee the redistribution of wealth from an innocent
manufacturer to an injured party “as a cost of doing business.”125 By allowing plaintiffs to misrepresent products’ performance results to the degree found in Malcolm and then by removing the only recourse the manufacturers have for refuting such misrepresentations, the Court is saddling
manufacturers with a burden that borders on insurmountable. Given the
policy considerations the Court outlined in Sternhagen, though, one wonders if an insurmountable burden is precisely the aim. That “the cost of
injury may be overwhelming to [a] person”126 is unfortunate, and the
Court’s evident sympathy to injured parties is admirable. However, it is
irresponsible and unjust to refuse to consider a product’s regulatory compliance under the policy justification that a manufacturer can simply defray the
cost of the injury among plenty of other people who bear no responsibility
for it.127 While this notion of spreading the loss among each consumer has
legitimate appeal,128 it does not follow that the Court should ensure access
to that emergency fund at every opportunity. As Marshall Shapo warned in
his book Products Liability and the Search for Justice, “we observe that tort
law must always be sensitive to the trap of Robin Hood-ism: requiring one
person to compensate another just because the first person is richer.”129
B. An Unreasonable Demand upon Jurors
It is heartening that the Montana Supreme Court has sufficient faith
that jurors can hear evidence regarding regulatory compliance and then
compartmentalize that evidence when it comes time to decide a case. Not
all of the Court’s members share the majority’s confidence, however. In his
dissent, Justice Nelson wrote, “it is precisely because we cannot rely on the
jury to parse evidence in this manner that we require evidence of the defen124. Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–719(2).
125. Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1142.
126. Id. at 1143.
127. Id.
128. See e.g. Marshall S. Shapo, Products Liability and the Search for Justice, 103–104 (Carolina
Academic Press 1993).
129. Id. at 104.
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dant’s financial worth to be presented in a separate proceeding.”130 Even if
one agrees with the more optimistic position, the idea that the juries can
perform the task does not mean they should.
Malcolm follows Sunburst as the second case in recent years in which
a punitive damage award was overturned by the Supreme Court because of
a district court’s misapplication of the evidentiary rules.131 In order to
award punitive damages, a jury must conclude that the defendant acted with
actual fraud or malice.132 The Court determined that Evenflo’s regulatory
compliance was evidence of its state of mind at the time of manufacture and
was, therefore, relevant to the punitive damage assessment.133 However,
the Court had already concluded that same evidence was properly excluded
by the district court with regard to the compensatory damage assessment.134
These conflicting standards basically require district courts to hold separate
trials to determine each type of award. With commendable forbearance, the
district court noted that “dilemmas such as this are unwelcome in jury trials.”135 The Court admits that it recognizes the “difficulties highlighted by
the district court,” yet it chose to punt on the issue because it “need not”
address it under Malcolm’s specific facts and instead ordered a new trial to
determine the Malcolms’ punitive damages with no further instructions for
the next district court that encounters the problem.136 As Justice Nelson
stated in his dissent, “this approach forces the Malcolms to retry their entire
case to a different jury, with the concomitant waste of time, money, and
resources to the civil justice system—a ‘dilemma’ left unresolved in Sunburst and unresolved here.”137
This is a dilemma that would be wholly resolved by adoption of the
Restatement (Third) approach because the jury would be allowed, simply
and unequivocally, to hear the evidence that is currently at the center of the
problem. Chief Justice McGrath and Justice Nelson recommend bifurcating
the trial to determine compensatory and punitive damage awards,138 but
Montana law requires that the trier of fact also determine liability for punitive damages.139 While the bifurcation approach would certainly represent
progress, the jury would still be forced to sit through two separate trials.
Chief Justice McGrath recommended that the Court “consider innovative
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 535 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 534.
Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–221.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 532 (majority).
Id. at 529.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 534 (Nelson, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 544; Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 533 (McGrath, C.J., specially concurring).
Mont. Code Ann. § 27–1–221(7).
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solutions . . . to provide a fair trial to all parties.”140 The Court should
adopt the innovative Restatement (Third) approach: let juries hear evidence
of regulatory compliance and settle this self-imposed predicament once and
for all.
C. An Unnecessary Diminution of Consumer Choice within the Market
The Malcolms’ claim that the OMW 207 was defective was based
largely on their opinion that Evenflo could have manufactured the child seat
using a superior alternative design; specifically, they claimed that the
seatbelt tunnel that the OMW featured on its base should have been used on
the primary unit instead of the seatbelt hooks.141 The Malcolms contended
that the seatbelt tunnel had performed flawlessly in both test and real-world
situations and effectively rendered the inferior seatbelt hook design defective.142 The test performance of the tunnel design was introduced at trial
during the Malcolms’ cross-examination of Evenflo representative Randolph Kiser, who testified that the tunnel design had never failed in testing.143 Not presented at trial, due to evidentiary prohibition, was the fact
that the hook design also passed all of its tests.144 After the district court
barred Evenflo from presenting evidence of the OMW 207’s regulatory
compliance and accompanying test results, Evenflo’s strongest remaining
defense was to suggest that the hook design was not inferior. Evenflo, perhaps with great foresight, declined to argue against its own alternative design, and the Malcolms’ claim eventually prevailed.
From a public policy standpoint, this led to the most harmful consequence of the Court’s refusal to adopt the Restatement (Third) standard.
The inability of manufacturers to present evidence proving their products’
compliance with applicable regulations provides a direct incentive for the
manufacturers to produce products that feature only the safest available designs. Though this initially sounds like a positive effect, it implicitly bars
from the market products that, while still plenty safe according to applicable regulations, feature designs that may be both attractive to consumers
and mutually exclusive of optimal safety. For instance, a person suffering
from arthritis may not want or need a child-proof medicine bottle, but Montana’s evidentiary standard would discourage a manufacturer from producing bottles without a child-proof lid because that is the safest available design. The needs of the arthritis-sufferer are sacrificed in order to preserve
the ideal of optimal safety.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 533.
Appellee’s Response Br., 9, Malcolm, 217 P.3d 514 (Mont. 2009).
Id.
Malcolm, 217 P.3d at 527 (majority).
Id.
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The OMW is a perfect example of this deficiency. At trial, William
Van Arsdell, an engineer and design expert, testified that the seatbelt hook
featured on the OMW 207 was more convenient than the seatbelt tunnel
and, therefore, “promotes easy [and] proper use.”145 Assuming that the tunnel design is safer than the hook design, there is no way that a consumer
can have, at once, the most convenient and most safe baby seat. While it
may seem absurd that a child safety-seat company would choose to promote
easy and proper use over crashworthiness, recent statistics indicate that
seven in ten children are improperly restrained in their seats.146 Given such
a high rate of misuse, it is reasonable to suggest that a seat that is both safe
and easy to install has a better chance of protecting more children than a
seat that is more safe when installed properly but more difficult to install.
Therefore, if a discerning consumer counts among her criteria for a baby
seat both safety and convenience, the OMW 207 might be precisely what
she needs. If, on the other hand, a consumer wants the absolute safest baby
seat and is prepared to tolerate the resultant difficulty of installation and
loss of convenience, she is free to choose the model that meets that standard.
Shapo touched on this notion of freedom of choice when he recounted
an influential Maryland case in which Harold Myers was severely injured
by his lawnmower.147 Myers argued that the lawnmower manufacturer
could have made the mower safer by adding an automatic kill switch or by
designing the mower without the clearance necessary for an operator to get
an appendage caught beneath it.148 In rejecting the plaintiff’s alternative
design argument, the Maryland Court of Appeals proclaimed that “in a free
market, Myers had the choice of buying a mower equipped with [the safety
devices], of buying the mower which he did, or of buying no mower at
all.”149 While the Myers case is not perfectly apposite when viewed alongside Malcolm—Montana law did not grant the Malcolms the choice of using no car seat at all150—the larger point stands: the Malcolms were free to
choose a baby seat that incorporated the very features they eventually declared the OMW 207 should have included. The fact that they did not
choose such a model does not, or at least should not, automatically render
the one they chose defective.
145. Id. at 528.
146. SeatCheck, Child Passenger Safety Statistics, http://www.seatcheck.org/news_fact_sheets_
statistics.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2012).
147. Shapo, supra n. 128, at 32 (citing Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 A.2d 855 (Md.
1965)).
148. Myers, 252 A.2d at 858.
149. Id. at 864.
150. Mont. Code Ann. § 61–9–420(1).
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The determination that a product is not the safest is insufficient to conclude that the product is not safe; unfortunately, the two are functionally
equivalent under the evidentiary standard promoted by the Court. If the
manufacturers were allowed to present evidence of their products’ regulatory compliance, juries would be able to see where on the safety continuum
the specific products fall and determine whether the manufacturers had sacrificed so much safety that the products are defective. As it stands, the jury
has no idea how safe the product is compared to any other product; it only
knows that the product is or is not the safest. This standard disincentivizes
creativity on the part of manufacturers and diminishes the choice of features
that consumers might enjoy. The Court should adopt the Restatement
(Third) § 4(b) and demonstrate that it values not only the protection of consumers but also their right to choose for themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tyler Malcolm’s death was tragic. It is easy to succumb to the temptation to do whatever it takes to ease the pain of his family, especially if the
primary sacrifice comes from a faceless corporation. However, justice is
not always served when the more sympathetic party prevails. Of course, as
indicated by the West Virginia case, the Malcolms very well may have prevailed at the district court level even with the inclusion of Evenflo’s regulatory compliance evidence. It is not the purpose of this note to argue that
Evenflo should have won; rather, the purpose is simply to show that the
jury did not have all the information it needed to decide one way or the
other. The result-oriented evidentiary standard employed by the Montana
Supreme Court with respect to the regulatory compliance of products generates verdicts that necessarily rely on incomplete knowledge. It is unfair to
defendants, unfair to juries, and unfair to consumers whom the standard
eventually deprives. The Court should reverse its precedent and adopt the
recommendation of § 4(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, thereby ensuring that future Montana products liability cases are
decided more accurately, more fairly, and with justice as the primary goal.
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